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ABSTRACT
In May 2002, a landslide on the south bank of the Blackwater River damaged the Missouri Route K bridge that crosses it. A flood on
the river triggered the landslide. Based on the field investigation and stability back-analysis, it appeared that the landslide actually
consisted of two separate slides – a shallow slide triggered by rapid drawdown of the river and a deep slide triggered by artesian water
pressures in a subsurface gravel layer. A rock berm that was keyed into the gravel was constructed to stabilize the slope. The rock toe
berm was designed to resist both the shallow and deep slide by providing weight to the slope to prevent a rapid drawdown failure and
providing a drainage outlet to relieve artesian pressures in the gravel layer.

INTRODUCTION
The Missouri Route K bridge over the Blackwater River is a
five-span steel girder structure near the town of Blackwater,
Missouri (see Fig. 1). The bridge was built in the late 1960’s
and the bridge piers are founded on H-piles driven to bedrock
or footings on bedrock. Figure 2 presents a design crosssection of the bridge.

In May 2002 during a flood event on the Blackwater River, a
landslide occurred on the south riverbank. The landslide
caused bridge Pier 4 to move approximately 12 to 15 inches
horizontally toward the river and 1 to 1.5 inches vertically
upward. The pier movement caused the bridge girders to drop
off the rocker bearings. The damage caused by the slide
resulted in the Missouri Department of Transportation
(MoDOT) closing the bridge to vehicular traffic.
This paper describes the landslide event; summarizes the
landslide investigation and back-analysis; presents the various
stabilization options that were considered; details the selected
stabilization option; and describes the landslide and bridge
repair.

LANDSLIDE EVENT AND INVESTIGATION
In late May 2002, local residents of Blackwater and the
surrounding area noticed a sag in the Route K bridge deck and
railing. The residents alerted MoDOT. On May 29, 2002,
MoDOT emergency personnel observed that the rockers
supporting the main span girders had “rolled over” at all the
bearings at Pier 4 of the bridge (see Fig. 3). MoDOT personnel
suspected that a landslide had occurred and closed the bridge
to vehicular traffic. MoDOT retained URS Corporation to
investigate the landslide and recommend stabilization options.
Fig. 1. Site Vicinity Map.
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Field Reconnaissance
After the floodwaters receded, a site survey indicated that Pier
4 moved about 12 to 15 inches laterally toward the river and
about 1 to 1.5 inches vertically upward. No other piers showed
movement.
On June 7, 2002, we observed a number of scarps striking
roughly parallel to the river extending from the riverbank to
approximately 10 feet north of Pier 3, as shown in Figs. 4 and
5. Lateral movements at the scarps were about 1 to 2 inches
and some showed vertical displacement of up to 12 inches. By
July 1, 2002 many of the scarps were more visible as a result
of dry weather. We observed another major scarp (originally
obscured by vegetation) that was located approximately 40
feet north of Pier 3 and extended approximately 300 ft to the
west to a concrete boat ramp (see Fig. 5). The scarp appeared
to be pre-existing and showed lateral and vertical
displacements of about 3 inches and 3 ft, respectively.

other boring, MoDOT installed an inclinometer socketed into
bedrock. MoDOT personnel observed water flowing freely to
the tops of the instrument casings (located 2 to 3 ft above
existing grade).
In early July 2002, URS drilled four borings at the site as
shown in Fig. 5. URS installed inclinometers (socketed into
bedrock) in two borings to evaluate the extent of the existing
slide and monitor slope movements during stabilization work
at the bridge. URS also installed vibrating wire piezometers at
three locations. One piezometer was installed to monitor
groundwater conditions in the gravel layer overlying bedrock,
and another was installed to monitor the surficial clayey and
silty soils. URS installed the third piezometer in a 30-ft long
steel casing that was lowered from the top of the bridge into
the river to monitor river levels. One end of the casing was
laid on the south riverbank while the other end extends about
25 feet into the river. All recent (2002) borings were drilled
using rotary wash techniques. Samples were obtained using a
split spoon sampler in accordance with the standard
penetration test (SPT; ASTM D-1586) or a 3-inch O.D. thinwalled Shelby tube (ASTM D-1587).
In addition to the recent (2002) borings, borings logs from the
original bridge borings drilled in 1963 were available. Twelve
borings were drilled in 1963 – two borings at each bent. These
borings are not shown in Fig. 5.

Site Conditions
Southwest of the river, the site consists of generally level
ground at approximately El. 600. Approximately 75 to 100
feet southwest of the river, the grade begins to drop toward the
river. The riverbank slope varies considerably upstream and
downstream from the bridge, but it was about 2.5H:1V near
the centerline of the bridge.
Fig. 3. Damage to Rockers at Pier 4.
Field Investigation
In June 2002, MoDOT drilled two borings through the slide
mass and into bedrock. The boring locations are shown in Fig.
5. In one boring, MoDOT installed an open standpipe
piezometer sealed into a gravel layer overlying bedrock. In the
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Bridge piers are numbered sequentially from 1 to 6, as
indicated in Fig. 2. At the time of URS’ field reconnaissance,
Piers 4 and 5 were located within the river. A concrete boat
ramp is located about 300 ft upstream of the bridge centerline
and a 30- to 40-ft wide riprap berm that extends into the river
is located about 30 ft downstream from the bridge centerline.
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Fig. 4. Northern Portion of "Shallow" Landslide.
Subsurface Conditions
Four primary subsurface strata are present at the site: (1)
interbedded silts and clays; (2) high plasticity clay; (3) gravel
and sand; and (4) limestone bedrock. Figure 6 presents the
subsurface profile and Fig. 7 summarizes the index and
engineering properties of the materials.
Interbedded Silts and Clays. Near surface soils consisted of an
interbedded alluvial deposit of low plasticity silty clay and
clayey silt with layers of high plasticity clay and sand to
approximately El. 565. Water contents ranged from 22 to
50%, averaging about 33%. SPT blowcounts ranged from 3 to
10, averaging about 5. The undrained shear strength (su)
determined from two unconfined compression (UC) and four
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Fig. 5. 2002 Boring Location Plan and Site Observations.
(Note observations in bold made July 1, 2002.)
unconsolidated-undrained (UU) triaxial tests ranged from 460
to 1400 psf, averaging about 900 psf. Drained peak friction
angles (φ') ranged from 27 to 33°.
High Plasticity Clay. All recent (2002) borings encountered a
2 to 4-ft thick layer of high plasticity clay underlying the clay
and silt layer. Water contents, liquid limits, and plasticity

Fig. 6. Subsurface Profile.
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Fig. 7. Index and Engineering Properties of Subsurface Materials.
indices in this layer ranged from 26 to 57% (3 tests), 65 to 89
(2 tests), and 41 to 64 (2 tests). Measured drained fullysoftened friction angle (φ′fs) ranged from 17 to 22°, while
published correlations for φ′ fs ranged from 14 to 18°.
Gravel and Sand. Underlying the clayey soils, all recent
borings encountered a 10-ft thick layer of gravel and sand.
Original bridge borings show that this layer pinches out south
of Pier 6. Generally, this layer is loose to medium dense with
SPT blowcounts ranging from 6 to 13. Grain size analyses
conducted on two split spoon samples indicated average D50,
D10, Cc (coefficient of curvature), and Cu (coefficient of
uniformity) values of approximately 10 mm, 3.5 mm, 1.3, and
4.0, respectively. Additionally, the possible presence of
cobbles in this layer was inferred from the original bridge
boring logs, drilling characteristics, and the one high SPT
blowcount value (N = 47).

indicated that the artesian pressure had dissipated by early July
2002. Groundwater levels in the slope stabilized at El. 587 to
590 and the river level receded to El. 580. The river level
remained fairly constant during the investigation and repair.

LANDSLIDE BACK-ANALYSIS
We conducted a back-analysis of the slope failure to estimate
the groundwater conditions required to trigger failure. This
section describes the key observations, discusses our
assumptions and back-analysis of the slope failure, and
provides the results of the back-analysis.

Key Observations

Limestone. Bedrock consists of the Burlington Limestone
Formation. Limestone cores indicated that the depth of
weathering is thin (typically less than 2 to 5 ft thick) and the
unweathered limestone is of good quality, with RQD values
ranging from 72 to 100%. Limestone outcrops near the bridge
were heavily jointed, with both open vertical joints and open,
closely spaced horizontal bedding joints.

On approximately May 20, 2002, a large storm triggered
flooding on the Blackwater River. Flooding typically occurs
every spring on the river. The Lamine and Missouri Rivers
(which are downstream of the Blackwater) were near normal
river stages at the time of the flood. The precise high water
elevation on the Blackwater during the flood is not known, but
watermarks visible in photographs of the bridge suggest a high
water elevation of at least El. 612.5 to 615.

Groundwater. Although initial observations indicated an
artesian head in the gravel layer (i.e., observed from water
flowing from instrument casings), piezometer readings

On May 29, 2002, MoDOT conducted an emergency bridge
inspection. The floodwaters were at approximately El. 599.
MoDOT observed damage at Pier 4 and closed the bridge.
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relatively low levels of the Lamine and Missouri Rivers.

Divers probed the riverbed and found that the riverbed soils
were relatively stiff and intact and no scour had occurred.

Initial stability back-analyses appeared to substantiate the
potential failure mechanisms and separate slides described
above. However, a number of assumptions were required to
conduct the back-analysis. Our assumptions are shown below.
Table 1 provides the input soil parameters used for the various
materials.

While installing instrumentation in the slide mass in early June
2002, MoDOT personnel observed water flowing freely to the
tops of the instrument casings (located 2 to 3 ft above existing
grade). Inclinometer measurements in the slide mass indicated
two zones of soil movement near Pier 4 – from approximately
0 to 8 ft below grade (within the clay and silt layer) and 24 to
28 ft below grade (within the high plasticity clay layer). By
June 25, the slope movement essentially had stopped. By July
1, inclinometer measurements indicated that essentially no
movements were occurring and that water levels had stabilized
at El. 587 to 590 in the slope and at El. 580 in the river.

• The upper clay and silt layer was undrained during the deep
failure and was assigned undrained strength parameters.
During the shallow, rapid drawdown failure, the clay and
silt were partially drained. We assigned this layer a bi-linear
envelope proposed by the Corps’ of Engineers (1970) for
rapid drawdown analysis. We used this simplified strength
envelope because insufficient test data were available to
define more detailed failure criteria such as those proposed
by Lowe and Karafiath (1960) or Duncan et al. (1990).
• At least the lower portion of the high plasticity clay was
drained during all cases due to its proximity to the gravel
layer. For modeling purposes, we assigned the entire layer
its drained shear strength and assumed that it was
hydraulically connected to the artesian water pressures.
• The gravel layer was modeled as a limit boundary to allow a
composite/block slip surface through the high plasticity
clay, the weakest layer.
• Due to modeling limitations of the computer software, we
iteratively determined the extent of quick conditions in the
gravel for various artesian pressures for the deep slide.
Where the gravel layer was quick, we assumed that this
would cause an uplift failure, i.e., “blowout,” of the clayey
soils above the gravel. We assumed that the boundary of this
uplifted block (along the fracture) would temporarily have
zero shear strength. For modeling purposes, we assigned
zero shear strength to the entire uplifted zone. However, we
restricted the deep failure surfaces to those that passed
through the high plasticity clay such that unrealistic surfaces
that passed through the middle of the uplifted block (with
zero shear strength) were not calculated to be critical.

Assumptions for Back-Analysis
Based on the field investigation, we anticipated that two
separate slides occurred at the site – a “shallow” and a “deep”
slide. The shallow slide likely was triggered by rapid
drawdown of the river, i.e., high water pressure in the silt and
clay attempting to exit the slope with no equalizing water
pressure from the river against the slope. This slide
presumably occurred after the deep slide as the Blackwater
River receded. This type of slide occurs regularly along the
Blackwater and evidence of rapid drawdown slides is visible
at numerous locations upstream and downstream of the bridge.
We suspected that artesian water pressures in the gravel layer
triggered the deep slide. Based on observations of limestone
outcrops along the northern bank, it seems likely that the
gravel layer is hydraulically connected to the river via jointing
in the limestone bedrock (and possibly local scour of the
riverbed). While the floodwaters started to recede, we believe
sufficient artesian head was present in the gravel layer to
cause a quick condition below the streambed. This caused the
clayey streambed soils (and toe of the slope) to fracture and
“blowout.” When the toe of the slope was lost, a slide
occurred within the high plasticity clay near the interface with
the gravel layer or along the upper surface of the gravel and
sand layer. These circumstances are rather unique because
similar failures did not occur during major floods in 1993 and
1995. In this case, we presume that the floodwaters receded
more quickly than the artesian pressure dissipated due to the

Back-Analysis Results
The results of the back-analyses are presented below. In
addition, we evaluated the current stability of the shallow and

Table 1. Soil Properties used for Slope Stability Analyses.

Unit
Weight
(pcf)

Soil Layer
Silt and Clay

115
c

Analysis Case
Back-Analysis of
Rock Toe Berm
Deep Slide
Final Configuration
φ'
φ'
c
c
(o)
(o)
Drainage
(psf)
Drainage
(psf)

Back-Analysis of
Shallow Slide
φ'
c
(o)
Drainage
(psf)
Partial

a

bilinear envelope

Undrained

300b

16b

Undrained

300b

16b

Interim Construction Case
φ'
c
( o)
Drainage
(psf)
Undrained

300b

16b

"Quick" Silt and Clay

115

--

--

--

Undrained

0

0

--

--

--

--

--

--

High Plasticity Clay

115

Drained

0

17

Drained

0

17

Drained

0

17

Drained

0

17

Gravel and Sand

115

Drained

0

35

Drained

0

35

Drained

0

35

Drained

0

35

Rock Blanket Fill

120

--

--

--

--

--

--

Drained

0

34

Drained

0

34

Bilinear envelope recommended by Corps' of Engineers (1970): φ' = 28o, c' = 0 to σ'n = 1250 psf; then φ = 16o, c = 300 psf.

a

b

Combination of c and φ used to model slightly overconsolidated soil with su = 300 psf at ground surface and su/σ'v = 0.29 (silt and clay primarily in triaxial compression).

c

Soil located in streambed at toe of slope.
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deep slide to provide an additional check on the input soil
strength parameters. We conducted the slope stability analyses
using Spencer’s (1967) method as coded in the software
program SLOPE/W (Geo-Slope 2002).

judged to reasonably approximate the critical conditions that
triggered failure. Therefore, we used these conditions to
design stabilization options.

Shallow Slide. Figure 8 presents the back-analysis results for
the shallow, rapid drawdown failure. As indicated in the
figure, the head of the critical slip surface corresponds to the
large scarp at the edge of the bank. Furthermore, the depth of
the critical slip surface corresponds to the upper zone of
movement measured in MoDOT I-1. We believe that this slide
occurred after the deep failure as the floodwaters had receded,
and that this slide did not influence the movement of Pier 4.

Current Conditions

Deep Slide. Figure 9 presents the back-analysis results for the
deep failure related to artesian pressures. As indicated in the
figure, an artesian water level in the gravel layer of El. 620 is
required to yield a factor of safety of about unity. This implies
that the flood levels were higher than El. 612.5 and/or joints in
the limestone charged the artesian pressures. This artesian
head triggered quick conditions over a wide zone in the gravel
layer. The soil labeled “quick” clay and silt indicates the
extent of quick conditions in the gravel layer. In addition, a
tension crack to the depth of the more permanent watertable
(about El. 590) was added to reduce tensile forces in the slices.
Figure 9 indicates that the head of the critical slip surface falls
between the cracks observed just north of Pier 3 and the
bottom of the critical slip surface corresponds to the lower
zone of movement measured in the inclinometer.
Because the stability analyses provided factors of safety close
to unity, these conditions (i.e., an approximate head difference
of about 20 feet between the river and gravel layer) were

For evaluating the post-failure stability of the
assumed that water levels in the slope and the
consistent with porewater pressures measured in
2002 and no artesian pressures were present in
layer.

slope, we
river were
early July
the gravel

The analyses indicated that the shallow slide was marginally
stable, with a factor of safety (FS) of about 1.1. This FS is
consistent with the minor creep movements observed in
MoDOT I-1. As such, the drained friction angle of 28°
assumed for the clay and silt layer appeared reasonable.
The analyses also indicated that the deep slide had stabilized,
with a FS of about 1.3. This FS was consistent with the
inclinometer data in MoDOT I-1 and survey measurements of
Pier 4 that indicated essentially no continuing movement of
the deep slide or Pier 4.

LANDSLIDE STABILIZATION DESIGN
We developed a number of design options to stabilize the
slope failure. These options included:
• A rock toe berm;

Fig. 8. Back-analysis of "Shallow" Slide.
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1 to 1.5”
12 to 15”

Fig. 9. Back-analysis of "Deep" Slide. Note that Pile Cap 4 was Moved 12 to 15 inches Laterally and 1 to 1.5 inches Vertically.
• drainage of the gravel layer via pressure relief wells;
• a rock shear key; and
• a “do nothing” approach for slide stabilization while
designing a replacement bridge pier to accommodate the
lateral soil load due to slope failure.

toe trench protects the berm from being undercut by local
erosion or scour of streambed soils at the toe of the berm.
Lastly, the weight of the berm prevents a shallow rapid
drawdown failure of the riverbank clays and silts.

MoDOT selected the rock toe berm option on the basis of cost
and its ability to prevent both the deep and shallow slides.
Furthermore, we considered it unlikely that the relief well
option would receive necessary maintenance and cleaning on a
regular basis.

Replacement Pier Design

Rock Toe Berm Design
Figure 10 shows the design configuration of the rock toe berm.
The only restriction for the toe berm was that the final berm
configuration was limited to the geometric limits of the
riverbank at the time of bridge construction in 1963. The final
slope of the toe berm is 1.5H:1V and the top of the berm is at
El. 590. This configuration was developed to provide a factor
of safety against slope failure of at least 1.3 throughout
construction and during a repeat of the water conditions that
caused the failure in Spring 2002 (i.e., river level at El. 599,
artesian head at El. 620). To prevent scour and erosion of the
toe berm material, it was decided to utilize MoDOT Type 2
Rock Blanket material (about 3-ft diameter rock).
The rock toe trench provides a drainage path for artesian
pressures during flood events. This element of the repair will
prevent a quick condition from developing in the gravel layer
and prevent a “blowout” near the berm toe. Furthermore, the
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As a result of the landslide-induced damage to Pier 4, it was
necessary to replace the existing pier. To achieve a redundant
design, MoDOT decided to design the foundation for the
replacement pier to withstand the lateral soil pressures
resulting from the landslide assuming that no slide
stabilization was constructed. We estimated that the lateral soil
load on the shafts would be uniformly distributed with a
magnitude of 10.8 ksf. This value corresponds to 12su, where
the design undrained shear strength, su, was taken as 900 psf.
To withstand these lateral pressures, two 9-ft diameter drilled
shafts were required for the Pier 4 replacement foundation.
The shafts required 8.5-ft diameter sockets drilled 17 ft into
limestone bedrock. Because of an accelerated construction
schedule, construction of the shafts was to be done
concurrently with slide stabilization work.

SLOPE STABILIZATION AND PIER REPLACEMENT
Stabilization and pier replacement work for the bridge started
in October 2002. During excavation of the bank to a slope of
3H:1V, a crack opened approximately 6 ft upstation of Pier 3.
The crack had a maximum horizontal displacement of 4 to 5

7

Fig. 10. Rock Toe Berm Design Section and Example Trial Sliding Surface.
inches and zero vertical displacement; however, ground
surface measurements at Pier 3 indicated that the ground had
subsided about 1 inch. We anticipate that slope movement
occurred because the contractor began excavating the
riverbank slope from the “bottom up” (rather than “top
down”), thereby removing confining pressure at the toe before
removing driving stress at the top of the slope. To prevent
further movement, rock was dumped along the lower portion
of the slope. Following rock placement, no additional
movements were measured at Piers 3 or 4, at the surface
survey markers, or in the inclinometers near Pier 3.

Route K Bridge over the Blackwater River was re-opened to
traffic on January 9, 2003, a little over six months after bridge
closure.

Prior to excavating the rock toe trench, the drilled shafts were
excavated and cased using temporary steel casings. A work
pad consisting of rock fill was placed around the temporary
casings to about 1-ft above the river level to allow access to
the toe trench location. The sides of the toe trench remained
nearly vertical until the gravel layer was encountered. Rock
fill was immediately dumped into the toe trench excavation.
We anticipated that the rock fill would become infilled with
river sediments over time. However, we also expect that any
infilling will be “blown out” by minor buildups of artesian
pressure in the gravel, allowing dissipation of artesian
pressures prior to any significant slope displacement.

Duncan, J.M., S.G. Wright, and K.S. Wong [1990]. “Slope
stability during rapid drawdown.” Proc., H. Bolton Seed
Memorial Symposium, J.M. Duncan, ed., BiTech Publishers,
Ltd., Vancouver, B.C., Canada, Vol. 2, pp. 253-272.

CLOSURE
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The remainder of the rock toe berm was constructed without
incident. The drilled shafts were poured on November 29,
2002 and December 11, 2002. Demolition of the existing pier
and construction of the replacement pier started on December
12, 2002. Following completion of the pier replacement, the
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